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At authentication

PAM Modules: macOS Persistence via /etc/pam.d

How PAM stacks in /etc/pam.d and sudo_local are abused on macOS for backdoor passwords and credential theft, and how to check and clean a Mac.

MITRE ATT&CK
T1556.003
Tactics
Persistence, Credential access, Defense evasion
Runs
At authentication
Set up by
root
Locations
  • /etc/pam.d/*
  • /etc/pam.d/sudo_local
  • /etc/pam.conf
  • /usr/local/etc/pam.d/*

How it works

macOS authenticates many services through OpenPAM. A program that uses PAM names a service; OpenPAM reads that service's policy and runs its modules in order for four classes: auth (prove who you are), account (may you log in now), password (change it) and session (set up the session). Each line reads class control module [arguments]. The control flag (required, requisite, sufficient, binding, optional) decides how a module's result counts, and class include other-service pulls in another service's chain.

The pam.conf(5) page on macOS gives the search order: /etc/pam.d/<service>, then /etc/pam.conf, then /usr/local/etc/pam.d/<service> and /usr/local/etc/pam.conf. A service with no policy falls back to other, which denies everything. A bare module name such as pam_opendirectory.so resolves to Apple's copy in /usr/lib/pam (on disk pam_opendirectory.so.2); a full path loads any library, anywhere.

Modules are libraries loaded into the calling process, so they run with its privileges and see what it sees: root inside sudo, su and sshd, and the password the user types. The services that matter most on a Mac:

  • sudo, su, login (Terminal logins);
  • sshd, because macOS enables UsePAM yes in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/100-macos.conf;
  • authorization and its _la, _ctk, _aks variants (password checks made through Authorization Services);
  • screensaver* (screen unlock), checkpw, passwd, cups, smbd, rvncserver (Screen Sharing).

Two releases changed the picture. macOS 11 Big Sur put /usr/lib/pam on the sealed system volume, so nobody can add or replace Apple's modules; a foreign module must be referenced by full path. macOS 14 Sonoma added /etc/pam.d/sudo_local: the stock sudo file starts with auth include sudo_local, Apple ships sudo_local.template, and sudo_local survives system updates, while edits to the stock files can be reverted by an update. That makes sudo_local the natural place for a durable change, legitimate (Touch ID for sudo) or not.

Where it lives

PathWhatWho can write it
/usr/lib/pam/pam_*.so.2Apple's modules (pam_opendirectory, pam_tid, pam_permit, pam_deny…)Nobody: sealed system volume
/etc/pam.d/<service>Per-service stacks shipped by macOS (/etc is /private/etc)root
/etc/pam.d/sudo_localLocal additions to sudo, kept across updates (Sonoma and later)root
/etc/pam.confSingle-file policy, read when /etc/pam.d has no file for the serviceroot
/usr/local/etc/pam.d/<service>, /usr/local/etc/pam.confLower-priority policy locationsroot, or whoever owns /usr/local
/usr/local/lib/pam/, /opt/homebrew/lib/pam/Third-party modules such as pam_reattach or pam-u2froot, or the account that owns the Homebrew prefix

There are no per-user PAM files. Homebrew's prefix belongs to the user who installed it, so a module referenced from there is only as trustworthy as that account.

How attackers use it

Every change here needs root. Attackers use it to keep a way back to root that survives a password reset, or to harvest passwords.

Accept any password for sudo. One line in sudo_local is enough, and it outlives macOS updates:

# /etc/pam.d/sudo_local
auth       sufficient     pam_permit.so

Any account allowed by sudoers now gets root with any password. The same line at the top of another service's auth chain opens that service.

Capture passwords with a planted module. A small library that calls pam_get_authtok and writes the result somewhere is placed outside the sealed volume and added as optional, so authentication still works normally:

# /etc/pam.d/sshd, line added at the top
auth       optional       /usr/local/lib/pam/pam_audit_helper.so
auth       optional       pam_krb5.so use_kcminit
auth       optional       pam_ntlm.so try_first_pass

Run a program at every authentication. macOS does not ship pam_exec, so a line naming it fails unless the attacker brings a module. A build that passes the password on standard input (FreeBSD's pam_exec has an expose_authtok option) turns any script into a credential logger:

auth       optional       /usr/local/lib/pam/pam_exec.so expose_authtok /Users/Shared/.cache/collect.sh

Loosen checks without adding anything. Deleting the pam_group.so … root_only line from su (it limits who may become root to members of admin and wheel) or turning required into optional changes who gets in without a single foreign file. Only a comparison with stock files catches edits like these.

PAM changes pair naturally with sudoers rules and SSH server settings: a responder who restores only one leaves the other.

How to check a host

On a live Mac, read the stacks and look for anything that is not a bare Apple module name:

ls -le@ /etc/pam.d /usr/local/etc/pam.d /etc/pam.conf 2>/dev/null
grep -nEv '^[[:space:]]*(#|$)' /etc/pam.d/*
grep -nE '^[[:space:]]*-?[a-z]+[[:space:]]+[^[:space:]]+[[:space:]]+/' /etc/pam.d/*   # modules by full path
stat -f '%Sm  %Sc  %N' /etc/pam.d/*                                                   # modified / changed
cat /etc/pam.d/sudo_local 2>/dev/null

For every module named by path, check who built it and whether an installer put it there:

codesign -dv --verbose=4 /usr/local/lib/pam/pam_example.so
pkgutil --file-info /usr/local/lib/pam/pam_example.so
shasum -a 256 /usr/local/lib/pam/pam_example.so

Compare /etc/pam.d file by file with a clean Mac on the same build (sw_vers): stock stacks reference only modules in /usr/lib/pam, and sudo_local does not exist until someone creates it. For timing, log show --last 7d --predicate 'process == "sudo"' lists sudo use, and file times on the stacks tell you when they last changed (an OS update rewrites them all at once).

Offline, the collection command already archives /private/etc/pam.d; add /private/etc/pam.conf, /usr/local/etc/pam.d and every module path a stack names. Then compare against a reference set from the same macOS build, hash the modules, check their signatures on an analysis Mac, and line up the file times with installer receipts and unified logs. macOS Persistence reads the stacks from the collection for you, offline.

What macOS Persistence flags

The tool reads every file in /etc/pam.d and reports one entry per service, named pam: <file>, with the stack (class, control and module of each line) and the line numbers of anything flagged.

  • pam_exec runs command (high): a line whose module path contains pam_exec.so; the parameter is the module's arguments.
  • Module loaded from module (high): a module named by an absolute path outside /usr/lib/pam/. Legitimate Homebrew modules referenced from sudo_local trigger it too; that is intended, since they run inside sudo.
  • pam_permit accepts anyone (high): an auth line loading pam_permit.so with sufficient (or a Linux-style success= control). The stock account required pam_permit.so in sudo is not flagged.
  • Command and path heuristics on the module arguments, for example Downloads and runs code, Reverse or bind shell, Runs from a temporary or shared folder and Runs from a hidden folder.
  • Changed date (low): the file was modified in the 7 days before the newest file in the collection. A macOS update in that window explains it for every stock file at once.
  • Differs from package package (medium): only when an installer receipt lists the file and its checksum no longer matches. macOS's own /etc files have no receipts, so stock stacks get no package verdict and never Not installed by any package.

Limits: it reads /etc/pam.d, /etc/pam.conf and /usr/local/etc/pam.d (the collection command takes the first two; add the third if it exists), and pam_permit accepts anyone covers binding as well as sufficient. It does not compare files with Apple's stock versions, so a deleted line or required turned into optional raise nothing. It does not hash or verify module binaries, and it reads files, not what a running sshd or sudo has loaded.

Cleaning up

  1. Preserve first: copy /etc/pam.d, /etc/pam.conf, /usr/local/etc/pam.d and every module named by path with their times (ditto or cp -Rp), hash them, and export the unified log for sudo, su and sshd around the change.
  2. Open a root shell (sudo -s) in a second window and keep it open while you edit: a broken sudo or su stack can lock you out of root.
  3. Restore stock files from a clean Mac on the same build, remove lines in sudo_local you cannot account for, and delete foreign modules. Test sudo, su and SSH logins in new sessions before closing the root shell.
  4. Check the neighbours: authorization plugins, sudoers, SSH keys and local accounts.
  5. Treat every password typed into an affected service since the change as exposed: rotate local and directory passwords, and any that were reused elsewhere.

References

See also

On Mac Forensics

The artifacts behind this technique, in the Mac Forensics reference: