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Find what keeps coming back.

Autoruns for macOS, in your browser. Drop a triage collection or a disk export: every LaunchAgent and LaunchDaemon, login item, Background Task Management record, cron job and login hook, with who signed it and which installer put it there. Nothing leaves your machine.

Offline · BTM-aware · ATT&CK-mapped

Drop a macOS collection, archive or folder

A tar.gz or zip from the collection command below, or folders exported from a disk image (/Library, /private/var/db, /private/etc and the home folders). Only the persistence locations are read.

The sample is FIN-MBP-03, a macOS 26 laptop where an intruder with a stolen session installed a LaunchAgent that keeps a helper running from a hidden folder.

Runs entirely in your browser: files are never uploaded.

Collect from a live Mac

Give Terminal Full Disk Access first (System Settings › Privacy & Security), then run this as an administrator. It archives only the persistence locations, the account records and the installer receipts; open the archive here.

sudo sh -c 'tar -czf "persist-$(hostname -s).tar.gz" /Library/LaunchAgents /Library/LaunchDaemons /Library/StartupItems /Library/Extensions /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins /Library/SystemExtensions/db.plist /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/preferences.plist /System/Library/CoreServices/SystemVersion.plist /private/var/db/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement /private/var/db/com.apple.xpc.launchd /private/var/db/receipts /private/var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users /private/var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/groups/admin.plist /private/var/at/tabs /private/var/at/jobs /private/etc/crontab /private/etc/periodic /private/etc/periodic.conf /private/etc/zshenv /private/etc/zprofile /private/etc/zshrc /private/etc/zlogin /private/etc/profile /private/etc/bashrc /private/etc/ssh /private/etc/sudoers /private/etc/sudoers.d /private/etc/pam.d /private/etc/emond.d /private/etc/rc.common /private/etc/launchd.conf /private/var/root/.ssh /Users/*/Library/LaunchAgents /Users/*/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist /Users/*/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist /Users/*/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent /Users/*/.ssh /Users/*/.z* /Users/*/.bash* /Users/*/.profile 2>/dev/null; ls -l "persist-$(hostname -s).tar.gz"'

Paths that do not exist on this Mac are skipped. The archive holds the local user records, which include password hashes: treat it as evidence. The tool reads names, IDs, homes, shells and the hidden and admin markers, never the hashes.

What is macOS persistence?

Persistence is how an intruder makes sure their access survives a restart, a logout or a password change. On a Mac it mostly goes through launchd: a property list in a LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons folder is enough to start a program at every login or boot, and keep it running. Login items, login hooks, cron, shell startup files, SSH keys, sudo rules, authorization plugins and extensions are the other doors.

This tool reads all of those places from a collection or a disk export, lists every entry with what it runs, as whom and when, and flags the ones that deserve a look first. It works like Sysinternals Autoruns does on Windows, or KnockKnock on a live Mac, for macOS collections, offline.

How it separates the normal from the planted

  • Background Task Management: since macOS 13 the system records every launch item and login item it loads, with the developer name, the team ID it was signed with and whether it is enabled and allowed. The tool joins that record to each plist: an item with no developer stands out.
  • Installer receipts: /private/var/db/receipts lists which package installed which file, with its checksum. A plist in /Library no package owns, or one that changed since, is flagged.
  • Command and path checks: downloads piped to a shell, osascript -e, decoded payloads, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, quarantine removal, programs run from /tmp, /Users/Shared or a hidden folder.
  • Cross-checks: com.apple. labels outside the system volume, a label that differs from its file name, recent changes relative to the collection time, launchd overrides that switch jobs on or off, the same program started by several mechanisms.

What it reads

  • LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons in /Library, ~/Library and /System/Library, and launchd's on/off overrides
  • The Background Task Management store, legacy login items and apps reopened at login
  • Login and logout hooks (com.apple.loginwindow)
  • cron, at and periodic
  • Shell startup files: /etc/zshrc, /etc/zprofile and every user's dotfiles
  • SSH: authorized_keys, ~/.ssh/rc, sshd_config and its drop-ins
  • Local accounts (hidden users, UID 0 clones, admin membership), sudoers, PAM
  • Authorization plugins, kernel extensions and system extensions
  • Legacy mechanisms still worth a look: emond rules, StartupItems, rc.common and launchd.conf
  • Installer receipts (BOM files) for package ownership and checksums

Limits

  • It reads files, not a running Mac: loaded-but-deleted jobs, in-memory implants and running processes need live response or memory forensics.
  • Code signatures are not verified: developer names and team IDs come from Background Task Management, which recorded them when the item was loaded. Binaries themselves are not read.
  • Apps that register helpers with SMAppService keep the plist inside their bundle; the tool sees them through BTM, not as files.
  • Configuration profiles and MDM payloads are not parsed yet.
  • A flag is a reason to look, not a verdict. Vendors do ship unsigned helpers and odd labels.

Questions

Are my files uploaded?

No. The page reads the files in your browser with JavaScript and a Web Worker; nothing is sent to a server. You can disconnect from the network after the page has loaded.

Why does the collection need Full Disk Access?

Some locations, including the Background Task Management store, are protected by macOS privacy controls even for root. Terminal needs Full Disk Access for the collection command to read them.

Can it read a disk image?

Yes, through Disk Image Parser: open the image there and use “Open in macOS Persistence” on the Persistence preset; the files go tab to tab, never through a server. A folder exported from any forensic tool works too.

Is this the same as KnockKnock or BlockBlock?

Those run on the live Mac. This tool works on a copy of the files, offline, which is what you have during an investigation, and explains why each entry stands out.

Why is an item from a known vendor flagged?

Flags describe traits, not intent: a vendor helper can be unsigned, sit outside an installer receipt or have a label that differs from its file name. The flags tell you what to verify.